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The United States Supreme Court has enumerated a constitutionally
protected parental right to control the upbringing of one's child that
includes the right to direct the child's education. The states,
meanwhile, have differed in their interpretation and application of this
principle when foster children's educational interests conflict with their
biological parents' wishes. Specifically, although some states permit
the judicial limitation of parental rights over children's education
during foster care placement, others do not. This Article is among the
first to consider the benefits and consequences of each approach in the
context of parents' rights and children's best interests.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, the relationship between parents and children is
viewed as fundamental.' This is true not only in the literal sense but
also in the constitutional sense that protects the relationship from
governmental intrusion. In fact, this relationship is so respected that not
only is it reluctantly terminated, but even when it is interrupted due to
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1. Odeana R. Neal, Myths and Moms: Images of Women and Termination of Parental Rights,
5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 63 (1995). "According to doctrinal constitutional theory then, this
relationship should not suffer state interference absent some compelling state interest." Id. at 67.
Meanwhile, education and foster care, the other subjects of this Article, are not fundamental
rights under the federal Constitution, although they do play essential roles in society. Angela M.
Elsperger, Florida's Battle With the Federal Government Over Immigration Policy Holds
Children Hostage: They Are Not Our Children!, 13 LAW & INEQ. 141, 162 (1994). Most states,
however, protect education in their own constitutions. Lewis Pius, Essay, Fighting for Children's
Rights: Lessons from the Civil Rights Movement, 16 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 337, 341 (2005).
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the child's temporary entry into foster care, parents often retain their
rights. 2
One right in this parental bundle of rights is the constitutionally
protected right to direct the education of one's child.3  Although
seemingly a subtle right, this right potentially has the greatest impact on
foster children due to the importance of education in today's
knowledge-based society and economy.4  In fact, the value of an
education cannot be overstated, particularly given that education has
long been viewed as a key to success, especially for those from
disadvantaged backgrounds.5
In any case, education in the United States is compulsory for
children,6 and few parents would veto their children's education during
foster care. A significant problem arises, however, when a parent's
educational decision for a child conflicts with the child's best interests.
Special education is particularly relevant to this discussion because
more than half of all foster children receive special education
services 7-a rate roughly five times that of the greater school age
2. See infra Part II.C (discussing the states' different approaches regarding parents' decision-
making rights, specifically New York's and California's); see also Jill D. Moore, Comment,
Charting a Course between Scylla and Charybdis: Child Abuse Registries and Procedural Due
Process, 73 N.C. L. REV. 2063, 2093 n.176 (1995) (noting that parents retain parental rights in
the form of a contract with the CPS agency, which has legal custody and provides substitute
family care). This Article uses the term "foster care" to denote state custody of children who are
placed voluntarily or involuntarily in out-of-home locations such as foster family homes, agency
boarding homes, or group homes. For a general background on the foster care system, see, for
example, Megan M. O'Laughlin, Note, A Theory of Relativity: Kinship Foster Care May Be the
Key To Stopping the Pendulum of Termination vs. Reunification, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1427 (1998).
3. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (determining that
parents had a constitutional right to choose a private education over a public education for their
children); infra note 22 (discussing the protection of the liberty of parents and guardians to direct
the education and upbringing of their children).
4. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("In these days, it is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education.").
5. Id.; see also Judith M. Gerber & Sheryl Dicker, Children Adrift: Addressing the
Educational Needs of New York's Foster Children, 69 ALB. L. REV. 1, 74 (2005) ("Adults who
speak out about the rocky path they have traveled from foster care to successful adulthood often
attribute their life success to their education and a caring teacher.").
6. Bruce C. Hafen, Developing Student Expression Through Institutional Authority: Public
Schools As Mediating Structures, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 663, 668 (1987). Hafen states, "Our tradition
asserts that this compulsion is in the best interest of children, because education ultimately
develops their capacity to enjoy the full and meaningful exercise of their adult liberties." Id.
7. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH &
FAMILIES, NATIONAL SURVEY OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT WELL-BEING (NSCAW ONE YEAR
IN FOSTER CARE WAVE 1 DATA ANALYSIS REPORT): EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Nov. 2003) (noting
that studies have shown that "the vast majority of children who have spent one year in out-of-
home-care have substantial social and cognitive impairments"); Sheryl Dicker & Elysa Gordon,
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population.8 Nonetheless, there is concern that many foster children's
special educational needs remain unaddressed. 9 Specifically, parents
may be incapable of making appropriate educational decisions for their
children because of mental health, substance abuse, or other life issues.
Others may decline to enroll their children in special education while in
foster care because of shame, confusion,10 or their desire to assert
control over their children even after the children have been removed
from their care.
When the wishes of the parents conflict with the educational interests
of their child in this way, especially if the child has been placed in foster
care, resolution is needed. Although the federal courts are silent on
parents' rights to direct their children's education while they are in
foster care, Congress has addressed this issue through legislation,
specifically, through the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA).II The states have also individually addressed this issue. Some
states, including California, provide their courts with mechanisms to
limit parents' educational decision-making rights while the children
Safeguarding Foster Children's Rights to Health Services, 20 CHILD LEGAL RTS. J. 45, 46 (2000)
("Studies nationwide reveal that half of all foster children have substantial delays in cognition,
speech and behavioral development, and some studies have found even higher numbers of foster
children in need of early intervention services." (citing N. Halfon et al., Health Status of Children
in Foster Care: The Experience of the Center for the Vulnerable Child, 149 ARCHIVES OF
PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 386 (1995))); CHERYL SMITHGALL ET AL., UNIV. OF CHI.
CHAPIN HALL CTR. FOR CHILDREN, EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCES OF CHILDREN IN OUT-OF-
HOME CARE 58-59 (2004) (finding that nearly half of all sixth to eighth grade students in out-of-
home care who attend Chicago public schools are classified as disabled, and that these students
are disproportionately likely to be classified as having an emotional or behavioral disability).
8. See Sheryl L. Buske, Foster Children and Pediatric Clinical Trials: Access Without
Protection Is Not Enough, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 253, 293 (2007) (noting 20% of foster
children receive special education services); see also Gerber & Dicker, supra note 5, at 29
("Foster children manifest disabilities at far higher rates than the general population.... Common
disabilities include neurological and developmental delays, as well as behavioral and mental
health problems.").
9. Gerber & Dicker, supra note 5, at 3. But see Cynthia Godsoe, Caught Between Two
Systems: How Exceptional Children in Out-of-Home Care Are Denied Equality in Education, 19
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 81, 83 (2000) (noting foster children are at risk for both under- and over-
identification with regard to special education).
10. See, e.g., Andrea F. Blau, Available Dispute Resolution Processes Within the
Reauthorized Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEIA) of 2004: Where
do Mediation Principles Fit In?, 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 65, 76 (2007) (noting parents'
avoidance of special education disputes because they find the system too complex); Godsoe,
supra note 9, at 105 (identifying a potential stigma for children with special education needs); id.
at 109 (suggesting that some parents or caretakers may withhold information from school
officials for fear of being blamed for the child's educational problems).
11. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2006 & Supp. 2008)).
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
remain in foster care.12 Other states, including New York, have not
created a mechanism to override parents' decisions about special
education services, 13 even when their children are in foster care and
their decisions run counter to the children's best interests.
At stake in these two divergent state approaches is the proper
education of half a million children in foster care. 14  The very
importance of this stake requires careful consideration of these various
state approaches, without the benefit of much literature on the issue. 15
This Article, therefore, endeavors to determine the benefits and
drawbacks of each approach in protecting foster children's educational
interests given the legal and policy frameworks, and who should be the
guardian of those interests. Focusing on parental rights in the special
education context-where the tension between parents' wishes and the
children's best interests may be great-this Article analyzes who could
be appropriate guardians of foster children's educational interests.
Part II of this Article therefore begins by considering constitutional
law on parental rights, the federal IDEA, and the differing state
approaches to addressing the educational needs of foster children,
focusing on New York and California. Part III then analyzes the
implications and consequences of these approaches, many of which
favor California's method of protecting the educational interests of
foster children. This Part concludes that if the education of foster
children is to be prioritized, states should consider procedures that
would allow them to limit or subrogate parents' rights over their
children's education when appropriate.
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Although sensitive to parental rights, the law permits the complete
termination or surrender of all parental rights over the child under
certain circumstances or, more readily, allows the temporary suspension
12. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing California's approach to the educational decision-making
rights of parents, which limits the right after the child has entered foster care).
13. See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing New York's approach, which grants the parents
educational decision-making rights even after the child has entered foster care).
14. Miriam Aroni Krinsky, Perspective on Youth at Risk: A Case for Reform of the Child
Welfare System, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 541, 541-42 (2007) (noting that there are more than half a
million children in the nation's foster care system at any given time). Importantly, "[w]hen
children are placed in foster care, their schooling should be a central concern." Gerber & Dicker,
supra note 5, at 73.
15. See, e.g., Godsoe, supra note 9, at 84 n.8 ("The lack of consideration of this topic is clear
in the lack of national statistics on this subject, and the apparent scant information or
consideration in protocols of at least some education and child protection departments.").
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of the parental right to custody of the child by virtue of the child's
placement into foster care. 16 While it is clear that parental rights over a
child's education are terminated when there is a complete and
permanent termination or surrender of parental rights,17 it is far less
clear who-the state, the parents, or another entity-should direct the
child's education when there is a temporary suspension of parental
rights to custody over the child.
New York and California, often considered bellwether states,18 have
each taken different approaches to this question, illustrating the two
opposing positions from the range of possible approaches. While
parents in New York generally retain educational decision-making
authority over their children even after the children enter foster care and
until there is a final termination or surrender of parental rights,
California allows temporary limitation of this parental right in specific
circumstances. 19 Before considering each approach in detail, however,
it is first important to examine the federal legislative and constitutional
backdrop against which these state approaches have been taken.
A. Parental Rights in the Constitution
Although family law typically remains in the domain of the states,20
the United States Supreme Court has ensured that the parent-child
16. At the outset, it is important to note that foster parents' constitutional rights differ from
biological parents' constitutional rights. See, e.g., Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1389-90
(9th Cir. 1985) ("[Floster parents do not enjoy the same constitutional protections that natural
parents do.").
17. For background on the legal significance of termination, see infra notes 36, 39, and
accompanying text.
18. SUSAN MARKENS, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD AND THE POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION 139
(2007) ("[New York and California are] often considered bellwether states since they frequently
take the lead in formulating policies and laws in response to changing social needs."); see also P.
John Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1, 17 (1985) (labeling New
York and California "bellwether states").
19. See infra Part H.C (discussing the states' different approaches regarding parents' decision-
making rights, specifically New York's and California's). But see Wendy Anton Fitzgerald,
Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 47
(1994) (advising on the foster care system's effect on family bonds).
20. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979) ("Family relations are a traditional
area of state concern."). Nonetheless, Justice Antonin Scalia has expressed concern about the
federalization of American family law:
I think it obvious ... that we will be ushering in a new regime of judicially prescribed,
and federally prescribed, family law. I have no reason to believe that federal judges
will be better at this than state legislatures; and state legislatures have the great
advantages of doing harm in a more circumscribed area, of being able to correct their
mistakes in a flash, and of being removable by the people.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 93 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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relationship is constitutionally protected, mostly through the Fourteenth
Amendment. 21 This protection extends not only to the relationship
between the government and parents in regard to a child's education but
also to the termination of parental rights.
In the field of education, the United States Supreme Court has
addressed the appropriate relationship between the government and the
parents in two 1920s landmark decisions, which together establish that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the
rights of parents to direct the education of their children.22  First, in
Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court held that a statutory prohibition against
teaching German in elementary school interfered with "the power of
parents to control the education of their own." 23 In Pierce v. Society of
the Sisters, meanwhile, the Court found an Oregon statute requiring all
children to attend public elementary school to be an unreasonable
interference with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing of their children. 24  Therefore, included in the
constitutionally protected bundle of parental rights is the particularly
strong right to direct the education and upbringing of one's child.25
These parental rights have altogether been described variously by the
Court as "far more precious than property rights," 26 "essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men," 27 and "more significant and
21. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (noting that the parents' right
to choose private education over public education is a fundamental liberty interest protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (noting that the parents'
right to hire a teacher to teach their child a foreign language is a fundamental liberty interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)
(noting that the freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment). Such protection has also been called the
"parental liberty interest," which permits parents to direct the upbringing of their children. See,
e.g., Kandice K. Johnson, Crime or Punishment: The Parental Corporal Punishment Defense-
Reasonable and Necessary, or Excused Abuse?, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 413, 425 (1998) (noting
that the parent-child relationship creates a Fourteenth Amendment "liberty interest" that allows
parents to direct the upbringing of their children).
22. William G. Ross, The Contemporary Significance of Meyer and Piercefor Parental Rights
Issues Involving Education, 34 AKRON L. REV. 177, 177 (2000).
23. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.
24. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35. One commentator offers an interpretation of Meyer, 206 U.S.
at 390, and Pierce, supra, as cases that view the child as the property of parents. Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 995, 997 (1992).
25. Godsoe, supra note 9, at 124.
26. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
27. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
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priceless than 'liberties which derive merely from shifting economic
arrangements."' 28
Strong parental rights in the field of education permit and encourage
parents to become passionate advocates for the education of their
children, even when their children are in foster care. In general, the
right to make educational decisions is only lost when a court terminates
the entire bundle of parental rights. However, when married parents
disagree about their custodial children's education, the courts generally
abstain from interfering because the family unit is intact.29 In divorced
or single-parent families, meanwhile, one custodian may legally be
designated to make educational decisions.30  Finally, in cases where a
child is placed into foster care-the primary group of children
considered in this Article-the question becomes who has or should
have the decision-making authority over a child's education.
Of course, parental rights are not limitless. Importantly, "[wihile
parents have a right to raise their children free from state intervention,
children have a countervailing right to protection from abuse and
neglect." 31 Therefore, the Supreme Court has allowed the state to act as
parens patriae32 and restrict certain parental rights and activities.
28. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty., 452 U.S. 18, 38 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
29. One married couple could not agree on the education of the child and brought the case to
court, but the Alabama Supreme Court held that it had no jurisdiction in "the settlement of a
difference of opinion between parents as to what is best for their minor child when the parents
and child are all living together as a family group." Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 107 So. 2d 885, 888-89
(Ala. 1958).
30. See, e.g., Morgan v. Morgan, 964 So. 2d 24, 30 (Ala. Ct. App. 2007) ("[The Alabama
statute] provides that 'joint legal custody' confers upon the custodians equal rights and
responsibilities for major decisions regarding the education of the child. [The statute] further
provides, however, that '[t]he court may designate one parent to have sole power to make certain
decisions while both parents retain equal rights and responsibilities for other decisions.' [It] states
that when a trial court implements joint custody based on an agreement of the parties, 'the court
shall require the parents to submit, as part of their agreement, provisions covering matters
relevant to the care and custody of the child, including, but not limited to . . . [t]he care and
education of the child.' In the event the parties cannot agree, 'the court shall set the plan."'
(citations omitted)).
31. Susan Vivian Mangold, Extending Non-Exclusive Parenting and the Right to Protection
for Older Foster Children: Creating Third Options in Permanency Planning, 48 BUFF. L. REV.
835, 835 (2000).
32. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990) ("[Parens patriae] refers
traditionally to role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability, such
as juveniles or the insane . . . and in child custody determinations, when acting on behalf of the
state to protect the interests of the child. It is the principle that the state must care for those who
cannot take care of themselves, such as minors who lack proper care and custody from their
parents."). For the distinction between parens patriae and loco parentis in the foster care system,
see Jennifer Sapp, Note, Aging Out of Foster Care: Enforcing the Independent Living Program
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Specifically, "neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are
beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well
being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by
requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor
and in many other ways." 33 The parens patriae concept is therefore
used to justify state intervention, including foster care, in family matters
to protect minors. 34
It is possible, although difficult, for a person to lose all parental
rights-not just those relating to education. Most often, parental rights
are terminated because of parental abandonment, severe abuse, or
permanent neglect.35 In every case, however, courts justifiably treat the
termination of parental rights very seriously, often doing so only when
no alternative is available36 and pursuant to constitutional and statutory
requirements. 37
In termination of parental rights proceedings, the primary
constitutional concern is the due process rights of parents who are at
risk of losing their parental rights. Therefore, child abuse or neglect
adjudications and hearings, which place the child in the court's
Through Contract Liability, 29 CARDOzO L. REV. 2861, 2879 nn.108-09 (2008). Specifically,
parens patriae was "used to describe the power of the state to act in loco parentis for the purpose
of protecting the property interests and the person of the child." In re Gault et al., 387 U.S. 1, 16
(1967). Both doctrines are intended to protect children: "Within the framework of parens patriae
(the protector of subjects unable to protect themselves) and loco parentis (the power to stand in
the place of the parents), the state has the authority to act in the best interest of and for the
protection of children." Honore M. Hughes & Michele Marshall, Advocacy for Children of
Battered Women, in ENDING THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE: COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO CHILDREN
OF BATTERED WOMEN 121, 171 (Einat Peled et al. eds., 1995).
33. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); see also J. Bart McMahon, Note, An
Examination of the Non-Custodial Parent's Right to Influence and Direct the Child's Education:
What Happens When the Custodial Parent Wants to Home Educate the Child, 33 U. LOUISVILLE
J. FAM. L. 723, 732-35 (1995) (discussing the compelling state interest in establishing minimal
educational requirements).
34. "In foster care, the state as parens patriae is acting as a parent for a child whose family
ties have been-temporarily, it is hoped-disrupted." Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status
of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81
MICH. L. REV. 463, 507 n.192 (1983).
35. See Neal, supra note 1, at 66 ("Termination of parental rights is usually based on parental
abandonment, neglect, or mistreatment.").
36. See, e.g., N.H. v. J.H., 571 So. 2d 1130, 1133 (Ala. Ct. App. 1990) ("[T]he court must
consider and reject all other viable alternatives to termination of parental rights so that it can
conclude that termination is the child's best interest."); In re L.V., 482 N.W.2d 250, 253 (Neb.
1992) (noting termination of parental rights may only occur in the "absence of any reasonable
alternative and as the last resort" (quoting In re T.C., 409 N.W.2d 607, 609 (Neb. 1987))).
37. See, e.g., Dep't of Human Servs. v. Compton (In re H.R.C.), 781 N.W.2d 105, 113 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2009) (determining, as a violation of parents' due process, that a trial court may not
conduct unrecorded in camera interviews of the minor children when considering whether
termination is in their best interests).
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jurisdiction, almost always, if not always, precede termination
hearings. 38  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that in a
termination of parental rights proceeding, "[b]efore a State may sever
completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child,
due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least
clear and convincing evidence." 39
Therefore, parental rights are constitutionally protected, including
those related to the determination of educational decisions for children.
However, these protections occasionally undermine the important
public policy goal of ensuring that children receive their educational
requirements. The federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
addresses parents' special education decision-making rights and their
children's educational needs, and is considered next.40
B. The Federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
Recognizing the importance of special education for all children,
Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped Children Act in
1975.41 This law is currently enacted as the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).42 The IDEA provides states
funding "to improve early intervention, special education, and related
services provided to infants, toddlers, children, and youths with
disabilities." 43 The purpose of the law includes ensuring that each child
38. See Neal, supra note 1, at 66 (explaining that a hearing, held to determine that a child has
been abandoned, abused, or neglected, and placement of the child under the jurisdiction of a court
generally precedes a termination hearing).
39. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982). Neal explains:
[Termination] means that the parent no longer has a right to participate in the life of the
child in any way unless the person or agency to whom custody of the child has been
granted gives permission for the child to see the parent or have the parent be a part of
the child's life.
Neal, supra note 1, at 66-67. In other words, "the parent becomes 'a legal stranger to the child."'
Lowe v. Richmond Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 343 S.E.2d 70, 72 (Va. 1986) (quoting Shank v. Dep't
of Soc. Servs., 230 S.E.2d 454, 457 (Va. 1976)).
40. See infra Part II.B (discussing the impact of the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act on special education with respect to the children and parents).
41. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., SPECIAL EDUC. & REHABILITATIVE SERVS., A 25 YEAR
HISTORY OF THE IDEA, http://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/leg/idea/history.html (last modified
July 19, 2007) (noting that Congress recognized that more than one million children with
disabilities were entirely excluded from the educational system, and that more than half of all
children with disabilities had only limited access and were therefore denied an appropriate
education).
42. See id. (noting that the Education for All Handicapped Children Act was amended and
renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA) in 1990).
43. Jennifer A. Knox, Comment, The IDEA Amendments of 1997 and the Private Schools
Provision: Seeking Improved Special Education, But Serving Only A Select Few, 49 CATH. U. L.
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with special needs receives a free appropriate public education
specifically designed to meet those individual needs, while ensuring that
the rights of such children and their parents are protected.44
Congress also recognized the importance of providing parents with
meaningful opportunities to participate in their children's education.45
While the IDEA requires state or local educational agencies to identify
and seek to evaluate all school-age children with suspected disabilities
to determine their eligibility for special educational support,46 the law
also requires parental consent before such evaluations may take place.
Specifically, the IDEA requires state or local educational agencies to
obtain parental consent at two points: before a child's initial evaluation
to determine eligibility for special education,47 and again before the
child is provided special education services. 48  Consent for an initial
evaluation does not constitute consent for the provision of special
education services.49 Thus, parents may consent to the initial evaluation
of their children and later refuse consent to their children's receipt of
special education services. Alternatively, parents may consent to the
evaluation and special education services, or refuse consent altogether.
In addition, parents may withdraw consent for special education
REv. 201, 204 (1999); see also Brandy Miller, Note, Falling Between the Cracks: Why Foster
Children Are Not Receiving Appropriate Special Education Services, 5 WHITTIER J. CHILD &
FAM. ADVOC. 547, 550 (2006) (explaining that the IDEA provides federal funding for all public
school children with emotional and learning disabilities as well as physical disabilities, including
visual, speech, and hearing impairments).
44. 20 U.S.C.S. § 1400(d)(1)(A)-(B) (LexisNexis 2005). Notably, states are not mandated to
ensure the educational success of special needs children; rather, states must provide procedural
mechanisms whereby such students may access free appropriate public education. See Godsoe,
supra note 9, at 93 ("Schools are not ... responsible for maximizing the educational outcomes of
exceptional children. The Supreme Court has made it clear that satisfaction of a child's special
education right is met by minimum equality of access, rather than by facilitating equality of
outcomes or educational potential. Thus, compliance with special education mandates is often
focused on meeting procedural requirements as opposed to outcome goals." (footnote omitted)).
45. See generally 20 U.S.C.S. § 1400(c)(5)(B). The education of children with disabilities can
be improved by "strengthening the role and responsibility of parents and ensuring that families of
such children have meaningful opportunities to participate in the education of their children . . .
Id.
46. Id. § 1412(a)(3).
47. Id. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(I) ("The [state or local] agency proposing to conduct an initial
evaluation to determine if the child qualifies as a child with a disability ... shall obtain informed
consent from the parent of such child before conducting the evaluation.").
48. Id. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(II) ("The [state or local] agency that is responsible for making a free
appropriate public education available to a child with a disability under this subchapter shall seek
to obtain informed consent from the parent of such child before providing special education and
related services to the child.").
49. Id. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(I); 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(a)(ii) (2008).
2010] The Proper Guardians of Foster Children's Educational Interests 157
services at any time and may place their children back in the general
education setting.50
For a subset of foster children whose parents' rights have been
terminated or whose parents' identities or whereabouts are unknown,51
the IDEA provides alternate consent procedures. 52 While state or local
educational agencies are still required to make "reasonable efforts" to
obtain parental consent, the failure to obtain such consent is not an
absolute bar to special education eligibility testing or services for this
specific subset of foster children. 53
Rather, someone other than the birth parent may serve as a special
education decision maker for foster children when the parents' rights
have been terminated or their identities or whereabouts are unknown,
provided that he or she comes within the IDEA's broad definition of
"parent." 54 If more than one person in the child's life meets the IDEA
definition of "parent," the child's birth or adoptive parent is given
precedence, and is presumed to have legal authority to make educational
decisions for the child, unless that person no longer has that legal
authority.55  If a foster child 56 has no IDEA parent57 or the parents'
whereabouts are unknown, a surrogate parent may serve as the child's
50. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(b)(4)(i) (providing that the state or local educational agency may
not continue to provide special education services to the child "[i]f, at any time subsequent to the
initial provision of special education ... services, the parent of a child revokes consent in writing
for the continued provision of special education . . . services").
51. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(iii)(II)(aa)-(bb) (West 2005).
52. These alternate consent procedures may also apply in states that include foster children in
the statutory class "ward[s] of the state." Id. § 1401(36) ("The term 'ward of the State' means a
child who, as determined by the State where the child resides, is a foster child, is a ward of the
State, or is in the custody of a public child welfare agency.").
53. See id. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(iii)(I) (stating that "reasonable efforts" must be made to obtain
informed consent from the parent of a foster child). The statute, however, does not clarify what
constitutes "reasonable efforts." Id.
54. The IDEA definition of "parent" includes "natural, adoptive, or foster parent of a child
(unless a foster parent is prohibited by State law from serving as a parent)," "guardian (but not the
State if the child is a ward of the State)," a relative "acting in the place of a natural or adoptive
parent," and a "surrogate parent." Id. § 1401(23)(A)-(D). Notably, Congress has deferred to the
states to determine whether foster parents should have the authority to make special education
decisions for foster children in their care. Id. § 1401(23)(A).
55. See id. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(iii)(I-11) (establishing that informed consent must be obtained
from the parent of a child unless the parent's whereabouts are unknown or the State has
terminated the parent's right to give informed consent).
56. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (explaining that the IDEA alternate consent
procedures may also apply in states that include foster children in the statutory class "ward[s] of
the state").
57. This includes children whose parents' rights over them have been terminated. See supra
notes 54-55 and accompanying text (providing the IDEA definition of "parent").
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special education decision maker.58  States or local educational
authorities have the duty to ensure that surrogate parents are assigned to
such children.59 Alternatively, a family court or juvenile judge may
appoint a surrogate parent to the foster child.60
In summary, parental consent is necessary for special education
evaluations and services, even for foster children whose parents' rights
have been terminated or whose parents' identities or whereabouts are
unknown. However, because the IDEA definition of "parent" is so
broad, other individuals in the child's life, including relatives, foster
parents, or surrogate parents, may serve as special education decision
makers for this subset of foster children whose parents' rights have been
terminated or whose parents' whereabouts are unknown.
On the other hand, for foster children whose parents still have rights
over them and whose parents' identities and whereabouts are known,
parental consent is generally required for special education evaluations
and services. The IDEA gives just three opportunities to override such
parents' special education decisions: (1) states may use IDEA's due
process mechanisms to override a parent's refusal to consent to an
initial evaluation; (2) in cases where a child is a ward of the state and is
not residing with the parent, state law may allow a judge to subrogate
the parent's right to make educational decisions for a child and appoint
someone else to consent for an initial evaluation; and (3) in accordance
with state law, a judge may issue a judicial decree or order selecting an
educational decision maker from among multiple parties who meet the
definition of parent under the IDEA. Each of these options is discussed
below.
First, school districts may, to the extent permitted by state law, use
the IDEA's due process procedures to override a parent's refusal to
consent to special education evaluations, but not services. Specifically,
if parents refuse to provide consent for their children's initial
58. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(23)(D) (defining "parent" to include an individual assigned to be
a surrogate parent); 34 C.F.R. § 300.519(a)-(b) (2008) (stating that a public agency has a duty to
assign a surrogate parent to protect the rights of a child if no parent can be identified or found, the
child is a ward of the State, or the child is an unaccompanied homeless youth).
59. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.519(b) ("The duties of [state or local educational agencies]
include the assignment of an individual to act as a surrogate for the parents . . . ."); id. §
300.519(a)(1)-(2) (requiring state or local educational agencies to ensure that the children who
have no IDEA parent or whose parents' whereabouts are unknown have special education
decision makers who can act on their behalf). Under the IDEA, state or local educational
authority employees, or anyone with a "personal or professional interest that conflicts with the
interest of the child," may not serve as surrogate parents. Id. § 300.519(d)(2)(ii).
60. See id. § 300.519(c) ("In the case of a child who is a ward of the State, the surrogate
parent alternatively may be appointed by the judge overseeing the child's case .... ).
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evaluation, state or local educational agencies may utilize state and
federal procedural safeguards to seek an order overriding parents'
objections and allowing the evaluation to go forward, but only to the
extent that state law permits such action.61 In contrast, if, after
reviewing the evaluations, parents refuse to consent to services, the
school district may not use the IDEA's due process procedures to
circumvent the parents' decision.62 A parent's refusal or failure to
consent to a child's receipt of special education services is final. 63
Second, IDEA specifies that parental consent is not required for an
initial evaluation in certain limited circumstances. If a child is a ward
of the state and is not residing with the parent, IDEA allows school
districts to proceed with an initial evaluation of the child without
parental consent if: (1) the rights of the parent to make educational
decisions have been subrogated by a judge in accordance with state law;
and (2) consent for an initial evaluation has been given by an individual
appointed by the judge to represent the child. 64 This option is only
available if state law allows for "subrogation" of a parent's right to
make educational decisions. 65 It also applies only to initial evaluations.
Thus, this IDEA provision cannot be used to override a parent's refusal
to consent for a re-evaluation or for provision of services.
61. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(ii)(I) ("If the parent of such child does not provide
consent for an initial evaluation ... the local educational agency may pursue the initial evaluation
of the child by utilizing the procedures described in section 1415 of this title, except to the extent
inconsistent with State law relating to such parental consent.") (emphasis added); see also 34
C.F.R. § 300.300(a)(3)(i) ("If the parent ... does not provide consent for initial evaluation ... or
the parent fails to respond to a request to provide consent, the public agency may, but is not
required to, pursue the initial evaluation of the child by utilizing the [prescribed federal]
procedural safeguards .. . except to the extent inconsistent with State law relating to such parental
consent.").
In situations where school districts have obtained an order overriding parental objections to
initial evaluations, court-appointed child representatives may provide consent for the child's
initial evaluation. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(iii)(II)(cc). The state may not serve as a "parent"
for consent purposes for children who are in foster care. See id. § 1401(23)(B) (defining "parent"
to exclude the State if the child is a ward of the State).
62. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(ii)(II) ("If the parent of such child refuses to consent to
services ... the local educational agency shall not provide special education and related services
by utilizing the procedures described in section 1415 of this title." (emphasis added)).
63. The parent's failure to consent to special education services absolves the state of its
requirement to make available a free appropriate public education to children with disabilities.
See id. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(ii)(ElI) ("If the parent ... refuses to consent to the receipt of special
education and related services, or the parent fails to respond to a request to provide such consent .
. . the local educational agency shall not be considered to be in violation of the requirement to
make available a free appropriate public education to the child .....
64. Id. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(iii)(II).
65. Id.
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Third, to the extent permitted by state law, judges may select an
educational decision maker from among the multitude of individuals
who may fit the broad definition of "parent" under the IDEA.
Normally, when more than one person meets the definition of "parent"
under the IDEA, the birth or adoptive parent is given precedence and is
presumed to be the parent. A judicial decree or order can override that
presumption, even when the parents' identities and whereabouts are
known and their consent would otherwise be necessary. 66 For example,
if a child had both a parent and a foster parent, a judge could, if
consistent with state law, issue an order appointing the foster parent as
the child's educational decision maker. The person appointed by the
judge would have full authority to exercise all parental rights under the
IDEA, including the right to consent to both evaluations and services.
However, before a judge issues such an order or decree, the IDEA
requires that there be a legal finding that the biological parent is not a
suitable special education decision maker for the child.67 Thus, in some
states, judges may limit a parent's right to make special education
decisions for the children, but only after the parent has been afforded
due process under the law.
In sum, the principles embodied in the IDEA seek to improve the
education of children with disabilities. These principles, though, do not
exist in a vacuum, but must instead be applied within the states' legal
frameworks, which are considered next.
C. State Approaches to Protecting Children's Educational Interests
In regard to foster children and the special educational decision-
making rights of parents whose whereabouts are known and whose
parental rights have not been terminated, California and New York
serve as illustrative examples of two opposing approaches. The
differences in their approaches, and those among the various states,
result from the recognition that although parental rights are
constitutionally protected, foster children often find themselves in foster
care due to their parents' neglect or abuse. Occasionally, the reasons
66. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.30(b)(2) ("If a judicial decree or order identifies a specific person or
persons ... to act as the 'parent' of a child or to make educational decisions on behalf of a child,
then such person or persons shall be determined to be the 'parent' for purposes of this section.").
67. See Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities and Preschool
Grants for Children with Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,566 (Aug. 14, 2006) (to be codified
at 34 C.F.R. pts. 300-01) (stating that biological parents are afforded due process of law in that
"judicial orders or decrees would [not] apply unless there has already been a determination,
through appropriate legal processes, that the biological parent should not make educational
decisions for the child or that another person has been ordered to serve as the parent" (emphases
added)).
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for the children's foster care placement may cast doubt on their parents'
ability to make proper educational decisions for the children. 68 The
states accommodate this reality in different ways, as illustrated by the
contrasting approaches of New York and California.
1. New York's Approach
Parents in New York enjoy strong protection of their right to direct
the education of their children, even after the children are removed from
their care and placed in foster care. Specifically, unless the parent69
cannot be located, his or her identity is unknown, or parental rights have
been terminated, parents in New York retain the right to make special
education decisions for their children even after the children's
placement into foster care.70  Thus, a parent whose identity and
whereabouts are known and whose parental rights remain intact may
refuse consent for the child's special education evaluations and services.
Consistent with the framework provided in the IDEA, 1 consent for a
foster child's evaluation and services in New York may be obtained
from an individual other than the birth parent in certain circumstances.
In particular, consent from such individuals is acceptable when birth
parents cannot be located, their identity is unknown, or parental rights
have been terminated. 72
In situations where the parents' identities and whereabouts are known
and their parental rights to the child have not been terminated, the New
68. See supra Part I (discussing that parents may be incapable of making appropriate
educational decisions for their children because of mental health, substance abuse, or other life
issues).
69. New York's definition of "parent" includes a "birth or adoptive parent," a "legally
appointed guardian," relatives "acting in the place of a birth or adoptive parent," and a surrogate
parent. 8 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 200.1(ii)(1)(2010).
70. See id. § 200.5(b)(6) ("If the [child] is a ward of the State and is not residing with the
[child]'s parent, the school district shall make reasonable efforts to obtain the informed consent
from the parent.").
71. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text (explaining how, under certain
circumstances, the IDEA allows a "natural, adoptive, or foster parent," "guardian," a relative
"acting in the place of a natural or adoptive parent," and/or a "surrogate parent" to provide
consent).
72. See supra note 69 (providing New York's definition of "parent"). Under New York State
regulations, the term "parent" "does not include the State if the student is a ward of the State."
Tit. 8, § 200.1(ii)(1). Children in foster care are wards of the State. See id. § 200.l(kkk)(l)-(3)
(defining "ward of the State" as a child under the age of twenty-one who has been placed or
remanded, freed for adoption, who is in custody of the Commissioner of Social Services or the
Office of Children and Family Services, or who is a destitute child).
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York state regulations are consistent with the IDEA in that they provide
the same three exceptions to the consent rules. 73
In practice, however, these three exceptions are rarely-if ever-
invoked in New York. First, the procedures that allow a school district
to file a due process hearing request in order to override a parent's
refusal to consent to initial evaluations are permissive, not mandatory.74
School districts rarely exercise this option, perhaps because of the
expense involved in pursuing a hearing and conducting the evaluations.
Second, New York state law is silent as to whether a judge may
"subrogate" a parent's right to make educational decisions, or issue a
judicial decree or order appointing someone else to make educational
decisions for a foster child. Generally, proceedings involving abused
and neglected children are governed by the New York State Family
Court Act,75 which does not contain a specific provision authorizing
judges to limit a parent's right to make special educational decisions for
children in foster care.76  Judges in New York lack clear statutory
73. New York's adoption of the IDEA's three consent exceptions are described below:
(1) A judge in New York may permit the school district to override a parent's objection to the
child's evaluation for special educational eligibility, in accordance with due process. See Tit. 8,
§§ 200.5(b)(3), 200.5(h)-(k) (enumerating the due process procedures school districts may
follow, which may include an impartial due process hearing).
(2) If the child is a ward of the state, such as a foster child, and is not residing with the parent,
the school district may proceed with an initial evaluation of the child without parental consent if a
judge has subrogated the parent's rights to make educational decisions for the child and a court-
appointed individual has provided the requisite consent. Id. § 200.5(b)(6)(iii).
(3) A judge in New York may appoint someone other than the birth or adoptive parent to act as
a parent for special education decision-making purposes. See id. § 200.1(ii)(4) ("If a judicial
decree or order identifies a specific person or persons to act as the parent or make educational
decisions on behalf of the student, then such person or persons shall be determined to be the
parent for [special education decision-making] purposes . . . .").
74. See id. § 200.5(b)(3) ("If the parents of a student with a disability refuse to give consent
for an initial evaluation . . . the school district may, but is not required to, continue to pursue those
evaluations by using the due process procedures described . . . .") (emphasis added).
75. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1011 (McKinney 2010) (stating that the Act "is designed to
establish procedures to help protect children from injury or mistreatment and to help safeguard
their ... well-being").
76. Similarly, there is no specific statutory authority in New York permitting a judge to
subrogate a parent's rights to direct the medical or dental care of the child while the child is in
foster care. While New York authorizes the local commissioner charged with the care of foster
children to provide "effective consent for medical, dental, health and hospital services for any
child" who is in foster care, see N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 383-b (McKinney 2010), the statute
offers no guidance on what procedural safeguards, if any, apply when parents object to medical or
dental procedures for their children while the children are in foster care, see id. (stating that the
local commissioner of social services or the local commissioner of health may give effective
consent for medical, dental, health, and hospital services for abused or neglected children).
At least one court in New York has intimated that courts may override a parent's objection,
albeit only after a fact-specific inquiry that considers, inter alia, the merits of the parent's
2010] The Proper Guardians of Foster Children's Educational Interests 163
authority to issue orders limiting parental rights to make special
educational decisions for children until there has been a full termination
of parental rights. Thus, while New York education regulations
anticipate situations where it may be appropriate to temporarily restrict
the special education decision-making authority of parents whose
children are in foster care, New York's Family Court Act does not give
judges specific statutory authority to issue such orders. Consequently,
when a child is in foster care in New York, the parents' whereabouts are
known, and the parents' rights have not been terminated, the parents'
refusal to consent to the provision of special education evaluations or
services for their child is final. Thus, the three mechanisms that the
IDEA provides for overriding parental consent are essentially
inoperative in New York.
2. California's Approach
California's approach is an important one to consider for several
reasons. First, it offers a contrast to New York's approach on this issue.
Furthermore, it applies to a substantial number of children-20% of the
country's foster care children are residing in that state alone.77
California takes a broad approach to addressing the educational needs
of all foster children, and not just those with special needs. For
example, California state law authorizes juvenile dependency courts to
"limit a parent's or guardian's educational rights regardless of whether
the child is, or may be eligible for, special education and related
services," as long as such a limitation is in the child's best interests.79
Furthermore, courts may limit a parent's right to direct the child's
objection and the state's parens patriae interest in overriding the parent's objection. See In re
Martin F. & Desiree L., 820 N.Y.S.2d 759, 773 (Fam. Ct. 2006). In Martin F., a local
commissioner provided consent for the administration of anti-psychotic medication for a three-
year-old child in foster care over the objection of the child's mother. Id. at 760. The local
commissioner posited New York Social Services Law § 383-b authorized the agency to provide
such consent. See id. at 762. The Monroe County Family Court held that the statute cited "was
not intended to authorize the non-emergency use of psycho-tropic drugs on children over parental
objection," id. at 773, and that the mother and child's constitutional due process rights were
violated when the local commissioner overrode the mother's objection without a court order, id.
at 771-73.
77. Melinda Atkinson, Note, Aging Out of Foster Care: Towards a Universal Safety Net for
Former Foster Care Youth, 43 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183, 201 (2008).
78. CAL. CT. R. 5.650(a) (2008).
79. See In re Samuel G., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 237, 242 (Ct. App. 2009). The court explained that
the "fundamental premise of [child] dependency law is to serve the best interests of the dependent
child," id., and that "[a]ll educational decisions must be based on the best interests of the child,"
id. at 243 (citations omitted). For an explanation of the "best interests" standard, see infra notes
97-98 and accompanying text.
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education at any time while the child is in foster care.80 Courts may
limit a parent's right to make educational decisions for the child at any
point once the child enters foster care, provided that doing so would be
in the child's best interests. These provisions allow California to take
advantage of the exceptions to parental consent that are contained
within the IDEA. Unlike New York, judges in California are therefore
able to issue orders subrogating a parent's right to make educational
decisions or appointing another person to act in the parent's place. This
is true even of parents whose identities and whereabouts are known, and
whose parental rights to the child have not been terminated.
Statutory and procedural safeguards, however, limit the authority of
the California courts to curtail or subrogate the parents' right to make
educational decisions for their children, even when they are placed in
foster care. Specifically, before a court can limit such parental rights, it
must make three separate findings: (1) that the state or local educational
authority has attempted to find and engage the parent in educational
decision making; 81 (2) the parent is "unavailable, unable, or unwilling
to exercise educational rights for the child"; 82 and (3) that "[t]he child's
educational needs cannot be met without the temporary appointment of
a responsible adult." 83 In addition, a court-ordered limitation on a
parent's right to direct his or her child's education must be clear and
specific 84 and "may not exceed those [means] necessary to protect the
child."8 5 Thus, orders limiting a parent's educational decision-making
rights may be temporary. 86 Parents may also appeal from court orders
limiting their educational decision-making rights over their children, 87
80. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 319(g)(1) (2008) ("At the initial hearing upon the
petition filed . . . or anytime thereafter up until the time the minor is adjudged a dependent child
of the court or a finding is made dismissing the petition, the court may temporarily limit the right
of the parent or guardian to make educational decisions for the child and temporarily appoint a
responsible adult to make educational decisions for the child . . . .").
81. Id. § 319(g)(1)(B) ("The county [must have] made diligent efforts to locate and secure the
participation of the parent or guardian in educational decision making.").
82. Id. § 319(g)(1)(A).
83. Id. § 319(g)(1)(C).
84. Id. § 361(a) ("[T]he court may limit the control to be exercised over the dependent child
by any parent or guardian and shall by its order clearly and specifically set forth all those
limitations.").
85. Id.
86. See id. § 361(a)(2) (establishing that the right to make educational decisions for a child
may be "fully restored" to a parent or guardian provided the limitation is no longer necessary to
protect the child).
87. See, e.g., In re R.W., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 785, 791 (Ct. App. 2009). Affirming the lower
court's order limiting the mother's educational decision-making rights and issuing a consent order
in her stead, the court explained that there was ample evidence of the mother's history of poor
"judgment in making decisions affecting R.W.," id. at 791-92, and that the "window of
164 [Vol. 42
2010] The Proper Guardians of Foster Children's Educational Interests 165
with appellate courts applying the abuse of discretion standard of
review.88
At the same time it limits a parent's educational rights, the court must
also "appoint a responsible adult to make educational decisions for the
child" as long as the court-ordered parental decision-making limitations
are in place.89 Also known as an educational representative, 90 this
responsible adult, who is court-authorized to make educational
decisions for the child,91 may be the child's relative, foster parent,
family friend, mentor, or a Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA)
volunteer.92  If the court is unable to appoint an educational
representative, and the child is in or may be eligible for special
education services, the court must refer the child to a local educational
agency for appointment of a surrogate parent.93
Therefore, California requires that each child in foster care has a
readily identifiable educational decision maker who can act on his or
her behalf. In addition, courts must have in their records forms clearly
indicating who, if someone other than a birth parent, currently holds
educational decision-making rights for the foster child.94
opportunity for meaningful therapeutic [educational and mental health] intervention [was]
closing" for this troubled 16-year-old child who had been in foster care for seven years, id. at 791.
The court further explained, "Mother's opposition to the recommendation to place R.W. at a
[residential treatment center in Wyoming, away from her home in California] was not in R.W.'s
best interest." Id. at 792.
88. See, e.g., id. at 791 ("We review the juvenile court's order limiting parents' educational
rights under an abuse of discretion standard . . . bearing in mind '[t]he focus of dependency
proceedings is on the child, not the parent."' (quoting In re Hadley B., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 234, 237
(Ct. App. 2007))).
89. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361(a) (describing limitations on parental decision-
making rights related to a child's education).
90. See CAL. CT. R. 5.650(b) (2008) (stating that upon limiting the right of a parent to make
educational decisions for a child, the court may appoint an educational representative for the
child).
91. For a list of responsibilities attached to the educational representative role, see id. at
5.650(f). Examples of such responsibilities include special education decision making, id. at
5.650(f)(1), representing the child in school disciplinary matters, id. at 5.650(f)(1)(E), and
"[bleing culturally sensitive to the child," id. at 5.650(f)(2)(B).
92. Id. at 5.650(c). In the special education context, these educational representatives may be
viewed as IDEA "parents" for special education decision-making purposes, with perhaps the
exception of a CASA volunteer. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text for information
on who may serve as IDEA "parents" and the rights of such individuals.
93. CAL. CT. R. 5.650(b)(3)(A); see also CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7579.5 (2010) (describing, inter
alia, the local educational agency's responsibilities in finding surrogate parents, the rights and
responsibilities of surrogate parents, and their qualifications).
94. See CAL. CT. R. 5.650(b), (d)(3)(a), and (d)(4) (describing the requirements in
documenting who will represent the child as the child's surrogate parent).
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In sum, where the parents' whereabouts are known and they are still
the children's legal parents, New York and California have taken
divergent approaches to parents' rights on the education of their
children in foster care, particularly in the area of special education.
This could be partially explained by differing political cultures and
legislative environments. These two illustrative approaches, however,
reveal the consequences and implications of each, as well as the benefits
of one of the functions of American federalism--experimentation. 95 To
fully reap these benefits, though, the lessons from these experiments
should be implemented more broadly following an analysis of their
problems and implications.
III. PROBLEMS AND IMPLICATIONS
Problems and implications arise in both the New York and the
California approaches, although one approach might favor parental
rights over children's educational interests. Given the importance of
education, this proposition should be carefully considered through the
evaluation of foster children's best interests and the fitness of those
available to guard their interests-primarily the parents and the state.
A. Foster Children's Educational Interests
Among the most significant aspects of a child's upbringing is
education. Yet, the current foster care system does not meet the
inherently important educational needs of children. To redress this
problem, it is important to determine a child's best interests in regard to
education and to protect these interests.96
The "best interests of the child" standard has been used as the guiding
standard in legal cases involving many children's issues.97  It requires
that paramount consideration be given to the interests of children.98
95. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("One of
federalism's chief virtues, of course, is that it promotes innovation by allowing for the possibility
that 'a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."' (citing New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
96. See infra notes 97-98 (discussing the "best interests of the child" standard).
97. Very often, courts in both England and the United States rely on the best interests standard
in deciding child-related cases. For background on the American best interests standard, see John
C. Lore III, Protecting Abused, Neglected, and Abandoned Children: A Proposal for Provisional
Out-of-State Kinship Placements Pursuant to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 57, 64 n.23 (2006). For background on this principle in
England, see Kerry O'Halloran, THE WELFARE OF THE CHILD 9-35 (Ashgate 1999).
98. See, e.g., Barbara McLaughlin, Note, Transracial Adoption in New York State, 60 ALB. L.
REv. 501, 517 (1996) ("[C]ourts have interpreted this 'best interests of the child' standard as
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Although the inherent flexibility of the standard has led both sides on
any issue to rely on it equally, ultimately the court determines the
child's best interests.
When a child's interests conflict with parental rights, the dilemma
requires a delicate balancing act.99 This conflict, however, does not
necessarily have to arise in the arena of foster children's education-it
is not entirely clear that a constitutional principle guarantees the
parental right of education of a child placed in foster care, yielding the
two differing approaches in New York and California.100 Without the
countervailing weight of parental rights in the arena of a foster child's
education, however, the child's best interests may arguably be
considered the determining factor when granting the authority to make
decisions regarding the foster child's education.
The proper education of foster children is in their interests not only
because education is itself important,10 but also because the duration of
foster care may encompass several years of the child's life. 102 Although
the goal of foster care is often reunification with the parent,103 some
foster children are never returned to the custody of their parents.104  if
placing the interests of the child paramount over any other factor .... ).
99. See Margaret Ryznar, Note, Adult Rights as the Achilles' Heel of the Best Interests
Standard: Lessons in Family Law from Across the Pond, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1649, 1651-
59 (2007) (discussing further the potential conflicts between parental rights and children's best
interests); see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Out of Children's Needs, Children's Rights":
The Child's Voice in Defining the Family, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 321, 327 (1994) (discussing the
tension between parental rights and children's best interests).
100. See supra Part II.C (discussing the opposing approaches of New York and California in
regard to foster children and the educational decision-making authority of parents whose parental
rights have not been terminated).
101. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text (asserting the importance of education,
especially for those children of disadvantaged backgrounds); infra note 113 (noting that education
contributes to a child's sense of stability); see also, e.g., Gerber & Dicker, supra note 5, at 28
("[A]ppropriate school programming may keep a child out of foster care or prevent placement in
a more restrictive foster care setting.").
102. Krinsky, supra note 14, at 542 ("[A]lmost half of foster children spend at least 2 years in
the child welfare system, and nearly 20 percent wait 5 or more years for a safe, permanent
family."). But see Betsy Krebs & Paul Pitcoff, Reversing the Failure of the Foster Care System,
27 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 357, 358 (2004) (noting that the current multi-billion-dollar foster care
system was never intended to raise children, but was instead intended to temporarily protect
infants and small children at risk of abuse or neglect).
103. Reunification essentially means returning a foster child to the biological parent(s) or
previous principal caretaker(s). See UNIv. OF CHI. CHAPIN HALL CTR. FOR CHILDREN,
PERMANENCY AND REUNIFICATION TRENDS IN 25 STATES, http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/fostercare-
reunifOl/chapter3.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2010). State administrators report that reunification is
the primary goal for families in the child welfare system. Id.
104. Each year, approximately 19,000 youths age out of the foster care system. Krinsky,
supra note 14, at 542. "Youths who 'age out' turn eighteen outside of the custody of their parents
and without an alternative permanent placement. In such instances, these youths obtain majority
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the period of foster care is especially prolonged in this way, it is
important that the foster children have competent guardians of their
educational interests, whether it is their birth parents or someone else.
On the other hand, when a foster placement is of a more limited
duration, the child still benefits by receiving the proper education while
in state care.
The current foster care system is not ideal, 105 and an area of great
concern is the educational deficits created by the child's placement into
the system. As observers note, "[T]hese vulnerable children-who
enter foster care already at risk for poor educational outcomes-do not
receive the education they need and deserve."1 0 6  Complicating the
situation further, many foster care placements are made without regard
to the child's educational history and needs.10 7
The lack of proper education for foster children may explain the
findings of a University of Wisconsin study that 37% of former foster
youth had not yet completed high school by twelve to eighteen months
after discharge, while only 9% enrolled in college.108 Furthermore,
"one-quarter to one-third of [foster] youth reported a perceived lack of
preparedness in several skill areas," such as managing money, living on
status via their age, not emancipation." Elisa Poncz, Rethinking Child Advocacy After Roper v.
Simmons: "Kids Are Just Different" and "Kids are Like Adults" Advocacy Strategies, 6
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 273, 320-21 (2008). These youths generally do not fare
well in society. See, e.g., id. at 321 (noting that very few youths finish school, and many end up
pregnant, in jail, or dead). The other methods of leaving foster care include either reunification
with the biological family or adoption. Mangold, supra note 31, at 837.
105. See, e.g., Kelsi Brown Corkran, Principal-Agent Obstacles to Foster Care Contracting, 2
J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 29, 29 (2006) ("By all accounts, America's foster care system is a mess.");
Cheryl Hanna, Bad Girls and Good Sports: Some Reflections on Violent Female Juvenile
Delinquents, Title IX & The Promise of Girl Power, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 667, 686 (2000)
("One counselor suggested to me that many of the girls who have been in foster care have had
very bad experiences with their foster mothers."); Clare Huntington, Mutual Dependency in Child
Welfare, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1485, 1489 (2007) ("The child welfare system is in serious
disrepair."); Jill Sheldon, Note, 50,000 Children are Waiting: Permanency, Planning and
Termination of Parental Rights under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 17
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 73, 74 n.7 (1999) ("Foster care, originally intended to be a temporary
solution, has become a financial burden on the states and federal government, as well as an
emotional nightmare for children continuing to drift from one temporary home to another.").
106. Gerber & Dicker, supra note 5, at 1.
107. Id. at 2.
108. Karen Gievers, Listening to Silenced Voices: Examining Potential Liability of State and
Private Agencies for Child Support Enforcement Violations, 25 NOVA L. REV. 693, 715 (2001).
168 [Vol. 42
2010] The Proper Guardians of Foster Children's Educational Interests 169
one's own, and parenting.109 Only half of post-foster care youth were
employed twelve to eighteen months after leaving foster care. 110
The educational deficits for foster children, however, could be
alleviated by a better approach to these issues. It is undeniable, of
course, that a youth's placement in foster care is traumatic.111 The
attendant instability and uncertainty will no doubt impact a child's
ability to focus academically.112  However, the problems inherent in
foster care placement may be eased if foster children's interests,
including their educational interests, are carefully guarded in every step
of the foster process.11 3 Before these interests can be implemented,
however, they must first be determined.
Most importantly, the educational interests of foster children entail
receiving special education if and when needed.1 4  To deny foster
children these special services may be harmful.11 5 Therefore, foster
children's educational interests require careful attention to their
109. Id. (citing Mark E. Courtney & Irving Piliavin, Inst. for Research on Poverty, Univ. of
Wis.-Madison, Foster Youth Transitions to Adulthood: Outcomes 12 to 18 Months After Leaving
Out-of-Home Care (July 1998 (rev. Aug. 2008))).
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 77, at 183 ("By definition, foster care youths have
experienced trauma."); Krinsky, supra note 14, at 541 ("Over time, these youngsters find
themselves separated not simply from their biological parents, but also from siblings and every
other anchor in their young lives. And in many cases, more is done to traumatize than to heal
these children."); Catherine J. Ross, A Place at the Table: Creating Presence and Voice for
Teenagers in Dependency Proceedings, 6 NEV. L.J. 1362, 1368 (2006) (noting that foster care
placement in itself can have a traumatic effect).
112. Gerber & Dicker, supra note 5, at 9-10.
113. See also Godsoe, supra note 9, at 146 ("Although a child's safety, stability, and ties to
siblings are extremely important, her educational needs are integrally tied to such stability and
must be considered as well.").
114. "Foster children often have mental and physical health problems that require medical
treatment, and many need special education services." Corkran, supra note 105, at 32. As Gerber
and Dicker discuss,
Children enter foster care with a broad variety of gifts and needs and, like other
children, benefit from the full array of school services, ranging from programs for the
academically gifted to those for the severely challenged. Appropriate school services
not only enhance the education of foster children, but may also affect child welfare and
judicial decisions regarding foster care placement.
Supra note 5, at 28. Godsoe adds,
Children in out-of-home care are particularly likely to have certain disabilities
qualifying for special education including mental retardation-eighteen percent versus
the one to two percent rate among all children-and severe emotional disability-
thirteen to sixty-six percent versus the incidence rate of two to five percent among all
children.
Supra note 9, at 99-100.
115. See, e.g., Godsoe, supra note 9, at 100 (discussing the harms of under-identifying foster
children in need of special education services).
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educational needs and entitlements under federal law, which may
include special needs education-as is often the case among foster
youth.' 16 Foster children's educational interests also require flexibility
in addressing the special circumstances of their position.
In sum, flexibility and attention to special needs are in the
educational interests of children. These, of course, must be balanced
with the best interests of children in having their family connections
maintained in most cases. The question is, however, who are the best
guardians to ensure this type of protection of foster children's
educational interests.
B. The Proper Guardians of Foster Children's Educational Interests
The proper guardians of foster children's educational interests are
those who can protect such interests. Such a determination hinges, in
great part, on the fitness of the parties available to make the decisions,
which primarily consist of the parents, as well as the state, and through
it, the foster parents. 117 Each will be considered in turn.
Parents' fundamental stake in their children's education is essential.
Not only does it protect the parental desire to rear children without
governmental intervention, but it also advances society's interest in
parents' acceptance of responsibility for their children's education,
given the undeniably high financial and nonfinancial resources required
to raise and educate a child.118  Parental rights are therefore best
classified as obligations coupled with privileges. 119 "The child is not
the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations."l 20
In a world of fit parents, there would be no quibble with these
principles. As Justice O'Connor underscored, there is, in fact, an
116. See, e.g., supra notes 7, 114, and accompanying text (noting that nearly half a million
children are in foster care, more than half of which receive special education services).
117. "[A] foster family .. . has its source in state law and contractual arrangements." Smith v.
Org. of Foster Families for Equal. Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977); see also id. (noting the
state's presence in the entirety of the foster care relationship); id. at 846 (noting a tension between
the rights of biological and foster parents that is "virtually unavoidable"). But see Godsoe, supra
note 9, at 139-43 (asserting that children can often be their own advocates).
118. The average expenditures per child in a middle-income, husband-wife American family
was $221,190 in 2008, versus $183,509 (in 2008 dollars) in 1960. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., PUB.
No. 1528, EXPENDITURES ON CHILDREN BY FAMLIES, 2008, at 23 (2008), available at
http://www.cnpp.usda.gov/Publications/CRC/crc2008.pdf.
119. See, e.g., In re Lisa H., 589 A.2d 1004, 1006 (N.H. 1991) ("[A] parent's authority is not
only a natural and essential right which is prior to the State itself, it is an obligation.").
120. Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
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uncontroversial presumption that fit parents generally act in their
children's best interests. 121  The problem, however, is that not all
parents are equally fit. Even those who are unfit are unequally so.
Of course, it is difficult to find the proper balance between permitting
overly frequent governmental intervention in unfit families and failing
to intervene when intervention is needed. 122 However, it is possible to
vary the level of governmental intervention by adjusting the procedures
mandated in government intervention in family, such as raising or
lowering the burden of proof for intervention, requiring or not requiring
lawyers to participate, extending or restricting the relevant proceedings,
and narrowing or broadening the definition of child abuse. 123
Furthermore, to permit the preservation of a child's family whenever
possible, it is necessary to divide child welfare intervention into two
stages: the first being foster care, which amounts to a temporary
intervention, and the second being the permanent termination of
parental rights.124  This two-stage intervention stems from the
recognition that it is not ideal to permanently terminate familial ties and
parental rights to a child when the family's troubles are temporary or
capable of resolution. 125
By definition, parental rights are entirely terminated at the second
stage.126 While they are not at the first stage-when the child is placed
in foster care often with the goal of reunification with the parents-even
this justifiable government intervention suggests the unfitness of the
parents at that particular time. 127  In fact, foster placement, in some
121. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (plurality opinion) (highlighting that the
State will not question a fit parent's ability to make decisions in the best interest of the parent's
child).
122. See, e.g., Krebs & Pitcoff, supra note 102, at 357 (discussing the concern that, on the one
hand, children are too easily taken from their parents, and on the other hand, vulnerable children
are not adequately protected from abusive family members).
123. See CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY LAW
1051-1118 (1996) (discussing the intersection of pluralism and family law in the context of
conflicts between parental authority to control a child's education and the state's authority to
ensure that children achieve some minimal level of education, as well as the intersection in the
context of custody or adoption disputes regarding religion, race, and ethnicity).
124. For an example of the circumstances resulting in a child's placement within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may then adjudge that person to be a dependent child of
the court, see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West 2006).
125. But see Naomi R. Cahn, Welfare Reform and the Juvenile Courts: Children's Interests in
a Familial Context: Poverty, Foster Care, and Adoption, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1189, 1222 (1999)
(arguing for additional child welfare options such as open adoption or longer term foster care
placement).
126. See supra notes 37, 39, and accompanying text (noting that courts take the termination of
parental rights very seriously and do so pursuant to constitutional and statutory requirements).
127. See, e.g., Cristina Chi-Young Chou, Renewing the Good Intentions of Foster Care:
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cases, may undermine the idea that these parents effectively act
according to their child's best interests. As one commentator suggests,
although some foster care placements are voluntary,128 many may be
the result of ongoing neglect or abuse of the children by their parents,
who often had limited education themselves. 129
Nonetheless, "the law continues to presume a merger of parental and
children's interests when determining parental fitness, even after a child
is removed from the home." 130  Furthermore, special education, and
much of the educational system, continues to hinge on parental
advocacy for the child, even when such advocacy is unavailable. For
example, the special education statutory framework on assessment and
service provision often initially requires parental consent. 13 1 The IDEA
Enforcement of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 and the Substantive Due
Process Right to Safety, 46 VAND. L. REV. 683, 683 (1993) ("Children enter foster care when
their own parents fail them."); Godsoe, supra note 9, at 125 ("[P]arental incapacity to care for
them is a prerequisite to their placement [in foster care]."). But see Marsha B. Freeman, Lions
Among Us: How Our Child Protective Agencies Harm the Children and Destroy the Families
They Aim to Help, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 39, 47 (2006) (noting that many parents who lose their
children to foster care are not bad people, but may need help temporarily); Symposium, The
Rights of Parents with Children in Foster Care: Removals Arising from Economic Hardship and
the Predictive Power of Race, 6 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 61, 74 (2003) (statement of Martin
Guggenheim) ("There is a shocking presumption generated by fear, by otherness, by a lot of
things-that the parents of children in foster care are bad for their children. They don't love them
enough or they don't have the ability . . . to raise them well. And I'm here to say that in my 30
years of work in this field, that is the most despicable slander of all, and the most difficult falsity
to refute.").
128. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 824 (1977)
(suggesting that a notable proportion of foster care placements are voluntary). As Smith
articulates:
[Voluntary placements] occur when physical or mental illness, economic problems, or
other family crises make it impossible for natural parents, particularly single parents, to
provide a stable home life for their children for some limited period. Resort to such
placements is almost compelled when it is not possible in such circumstance to place
the child with a relative or friend, or to pay for the services of a homemaker or
boarding school.
Id. at 824-25; see also id. at 834 (noting that some voluntary proceedings might occur because of
the state's threat of neglect proceedings). Voluntary placement of a child in foster care, however,
does not necessarily permit voluntary withdrawal. On the contrary, such a withdrawal often
requires the approval of the court or a supervising agency. Kevin M. Ryan, Stemming the Tide of
Foster Care Runaways: A Due Process Perspective, 42 CATH. U. L. REv. 271, 306-07 (1993).
129. Rebekah Gleason Hope, Foster Children and the IDEA: The Fox No Longer Guarding
the Henhouse?, 69 LA. L. REv. 349, 360-61 (2009).
130. Godsoe, supra note 9, at 125.
131. Id. at 84-85 (citing 20 U.S.C.S. § 1414 (LexisNexis 2010)); see also 34 C.F.R. § 303.404
(2005) (describing parental consent as a prerequisite for certain action on behalf of a child and
detailing the course of action to be followed in the absence of consent).
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particularly "relies on parents to enforce the identification and
appropriate placement of children with disabilities."1 32
Yet parents with children in foster care sometimes neglect or refuse
to provide consent--even when services are clearly necessary by any
standard-and thereby deprive their children of an education tailored to
their needs. 133 For example, caseworkers have stated that biological
parents, in some circumstances, refuse to sign the proper consent forms
for testing or special programs.134 Of course, parental refusal to provide
consent may sometimes be proper if, for example, the school district's
service recommendations are inappropriate and do not address the
child's specific needs. Nonetheless, "[t]he absence of adult advocates
in the educational system for foster children-resulting from a lack of
parental support and the prohibitions on other adults, such as child
protection workers, filling this role . . . mean[s] that many do not
receive the evaluations and referrals that they require." 35
According to certain state laws, state or local educational authorities
may use the IDEA's due process hearing mechanisms to seek an order
overriding a parent's refusal to consent to the child's evaluation for
special education eligibility. 136 However, as one observer notes, "[T]he
default is often not to evaluate and refer children without parental
advocacy, let alone without parental consent."1 37  As a result, foster
children sometimes do not have access to special education programs.
There may be benefits, therefore, to either relieving the educational
system's reliance on parental consent, or allowing educational guardians
to serve as substitutes for parents whose decision-making ability is
impaired or otherwise compromised. Given the constitutionally
meaningful and protected role of parental autonomy for fit parents, 138
the preferred approach would permit an educational guardian to
substitute for parents who are unable to effectively guard the
educational interests of their children in foster care. Therefore,
132. Godsoe, supra note 9, at 138.
133. See, e.g., supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the concern that many foster
children's special needs remain unaddressed).
134. Miller, supra note 43, at 554.
135. Godsoe, supra note 9, at 101.
136. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (explaining that the IDEA requires an initial
finding through appropriate legal processes that the biological parent of a child is not the suitable
person to make educational decisions before another individual is appointed to fill such role).
137. Godsoe, supra note 9, at 85 n.13.
138. See supra Part II.A (discussing the constitutional protection of the parent-child
relationship afforded primarily by the Fourteenth Amendment and Supreme Court decisions
reinforcing said protection).
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although states may not often be the ideal guardian,139 states might
beneficially exercise their parens patriael40 power to limit the
educational decision-making authority of parents whose children are in
foster care and whose educational decision-making authority may be
impaired. In their stead, states may appoint educational guardians who
might act more in the children's best interests1 41-as California has
done.
Of course, the California law also has the potential to be overused
and overly intrusive on parental rights. This can be problematic when,
in many cases, it may be in the child's best interests for the parents to
remain involved in educational decision making, especially if
eliminating parents from the educational decision-making process
undermines subsequent efforts at family reunification.
Nonetheless, temporary limitation of parental rights to make special
educational decisions and the appointment of educational guardians
might be a more flexible way to serve foster children's interests than the
current legal structure in states such as New York. To minimize the
potential for abuse, and to protect parents' due process rights, the state
or local court should conduct a thorough hearing on the issue of whether
the parents' educational decision-making ability is impaired or
otherwise compromised before it can limit the parents' right to make
special educational decisions for the child in foster care.
139. See Carter Dillard, Child Welfare and Future Persons, 43 GA. L. REV. 367, 374 n.21
("The state makes an extraordinarily bad parent that appears to border on the unfit."); Godsoe,
supra note 9, at 84 ("Under-funded and overburdened child protection and education systems fail
in their mission of adequately overseeing children's healthy development in school and at
home."); John Schomberg, Equity v. Autonomy: The Problems of Private Donations to Public
Schools, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 143, 145 (1998) ("[E]ducation must fight for tax money
against other high-demand public services such as public health, mass transit, and crime
prevention.").
140. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (noting that the concept of parens patriae
allows the state to restrict certain parental rights and activities in order to protect the best interests
of the child).
141. Although beyond the scope of this Article, there may be financial costs associated not
only with the appointment of educational surrogates, but also with the provision of special
education for those foster children qualifying for it. Nonetheless, these costs may be offset by the
savings associated with producing productive citizens through the foster care system. In the
current system, meanwhile, "[clhildren who have grown up or left foster care fill the nation's
jails, mental hospitals and welfare rolls." Jill Chaifetz, Listening to Foster Children in
Accordance with the Law: The Failure to Serve Children in State Care, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 1, 8 (1999). This is true even though the United States already spends billions of
dollars on the foster care system every year. See, e.g., Jim Moye & Roberta Rinker, Essay, It's a
Hard Knock Life: Does the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 Adequately Address
Problems in the Child Welfare System?, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 375, 377 (2002) ("Of the 581,000
foster children, 55% are supported through federal funds. The total cost to administer the foster
care system in America is over $7 billion a year.").
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Of course, the specific appointment of an educational decision-
making authority on behalf of foster children may vary. Although
foster parents may be given more rights in the education of foster
children, 142 states may prefer to appoint independent educational
surrogates, especially if the children must move between foster homes.
Furthermore, independent educational decision makers might better be
able to specialize in learning and addressing foster children's
educational needs. Nonetheless, it is true that children's best interests
are more complicated than just their educational interests, which would
otherwise be uniformly aided by the expertise of an independent
educational specialist. However, whoever the guardian of a foster
child's educational interests, whether a parent or not, this guardian must
clearly understand the imposed duty to advocate for the child in the
educational setting. The proactive consideration of children's education
and the appointment of an educational guardian will, at the very least,
underscore for parents, foster parents, and others the importance of
guarding children's educational interests. 143 In the meantime, however,
such attention to foster children's education continues to be lacking,144
though California's model does offer guidance for the resolution of
some of these issues.
IV. CONCLUSION
The parent-child relationship is constitutionally protected and parents
hold a bundle of rights that includes the right to direct the education of
their children. Nonetheless, the law permits governmental intervention
for a child's welfare-both in the form of the child's temporary
placement in foster care and the permanent termination of parental
rights. While all parental rights are terminated in the latter situation,
142. "Several district courts have found a limited liberty interest in the foster family
relationship." Godsoe, supra note 9, at 128 (citing Rodrigues v. McLoughlin, No. 96-CV-1986,
1999 WL 9834 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1999); Brown v. Cnty. of San Joaquin, 601 F. Supp. 653 (E.D.
Cal. 1985); Rivera v. Marcus, 533 F. Supp. 203 (D. Conn. 1982)); see Godsoe, supra note 9, at
143-46 (discussing the potential for foster parents to play more of an advocacy role for their
foster children); see also Gerber & Dicker, supra note 5, at 25-26 ("A foster parent serving as the
child's 'parent' under the IDEA in special education matters, however, will acquire records
access rights under FERPA." (citing 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(23)(A) (West Supp. 2005))). But see
Pitts, supra note 1, at 341, 344 (noting that foster parents and employees of government agencies
may fear speaking out against the foster care system for fear of repercussions).
143. See also Krebs & Pitcoff, supra note 102, at 363 (noting the importance of accustoming
foster youth to the aspiration for higher education).
144. "In one study, 65% of foster care youths reported that a parent or guardian had never
attended a teacher conference." Atkinson, supra note 77, at 192.
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parents often, especially in states such as New York, retain many of
their parental rights when their children are in foster care.
However, if the educational decision-making ability of parents of
foster children is impaired or otherwise compromised, their retention of
the right to make educational decisions may be counterproductive to the
protection of the educational interests of foster children. For this
reason, California has permitted the limitation of parental educational
decision-making rights upon a child's entry into foster care, giving the
state a mechanism by which to better align children's education with
their best interests.
This model, therefore, may offer certain insights for states seeking to
better protect and promote the educational interests of foster children.
In the meantime, however, scores of foster children across the country
will continue to be at risk of failing to realize their educational potential.
When foster children fail, so, too, has the foster care system that was
designed to protect them.
